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1 Introduction
This article is about synchronized iterative voting in the context of Approval Voting, the
voting system in which a ballot can contain the names of any subset of candidates, and
the candidate whose name is present in the most ballots is elected.
Assuming that, before the election, successive polls occur to which voters react strate-
gically, we shall exhibit examples showing the possibility of cycles with strong negative
properties (in particular, non election of an existing Condorcet winner, or possible elec-
tion of a candidate strongly rejected by a majority of the electorate). We thus uncover
new flaws in the Approval Voting system, which complement in particular the examples
provided in [SDL06].
Let us mention some previous works in iterative voting. In the case of Plurality Voting,
discussed in slightly more details in Section 6, very general convergence results have been
obtained by Meir and co-authors [MLR14, Mei15, MPRJ17]. Many other voting rules
–not Approval– have been considered by Lev and co-authors [LR16, KSLR17]. Their
theoretical results are negative (no guaranteed convergence) but empirical tests seem
to indicate that cycles are rare. Note that in most of these results (the exceptions
concerning Plurality), voters are assumed to adjust their ballot one by one. Our setting
will be different, Successive Polling Dynamics modeling a situation where all voters are
informed of the expected result at the same time. Other interesting results can be found
in [OLP+, ROL+15].
*Université Paris-Est, Laboratoire d’Analyse et de Matématiques Appliquées (UMR 8050), UPEM,
UPEC, CNRS, F-94010, Créteil, France
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1.1 On sincerity, strategic voting and straightforwardness
In Approval Voting, one can say that a ballot is sincere whenever any candidate preferred
to another whose name present on the ballot, must also be on the ballot.
Durand notes in [Dur15] that in general the meaning of “sincerity” is open to inter-
pretation, and that this word has often been used to argue against strategic voting.
He makes a compelling point that strategic voting is to be expected, and even advised
to voters, and that what causes a democratic problem is the necessity of resorting to
strategies to get the best ouctome rather than the fact that voters embrace this neces-
sity (“Manipuler c’est bien, la manipulabilité c’est mal”). Insufficient information, too
contrived (and as a consequence non-uniformly applied) strategies create asymmetries
among voters; and ballots deemed sincere can be cast but afterward regretted in view of
the outcome of the election, thus lowering trust and confidence in the democratic system.
A most important property of voters’ behavior is thus straightforwardness, meaning their
chosen ballot to depend only on one’s preferences, not on the expected outcome of the
election.
In approval Voting, as soon as there are more than two candidates there are several
sincere ballots, corresponding to the various point in her order of preference where the
voter can draw the line between acceptance and rejection. In particular, strategic voting
(i.e. choosing one’s ballot depending on the ballots expected to be cast by the other
voters) can occur even when restricting to sincere votes. In other words, sincerity in the
above sense does not imply straightforwardness. Our examples will in particular show
how very far from straightforwardness Approval Voting can be in some circumstances.
1.2 Is Approval Voting a Condorcet system “in practice”?
While not a Condorcet system, several arguments have been raised that could seem to
indicate it might be close Condorcet “in practice”. Brams and Sanver [BS03] showed
that when a Condorcet winner exists, her election is a strong Nash equilibrium, i.e no
coalition of voters can organize a strategical vote so as to improve the outcome for each
and every one of the members of the coalition (note that other outcomes can also be
strong Nash equilibrium). Strong Nash equilibrium are said by Brams and Sanver to be
“globally stable”, but one absent point in their work is whether they are “attractive”
equilibrium (in a sense to be made precise below), which has a strong bearing to the
question whether they should be expected to be reached in practice.
Laslier [Las09] proved that under a large-electorate model with uncertainty in the
recording of votes and perfect common information, the best course of action for voters
results in a particular strategy, the “Leader Rule”. Additionally, he proved that if there
is a Condorcet winner and all voters apply the Leader Rule, then there is at least one
equilibrium, and any equilibrium elects the Condorcet winner. Let us give more detail
on these results, explained in the framework we shall use here.
To be applied, the Leader Rule needs voters to have a conception about which candi-
date is likely to win the election (the expected winner), and which candidate is likely to
turn second (the expected runner-up). The LR then consists, given the preferences of
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the voter, in voting for all candidates preferred to the expected winner, to no candidate
the expected winner is preferred to, and to vote for the expected winner if and only if
she is preferred to the expected runner-up; in particular, strategic voting selects one par-
ticular case of the various sincere ways to vote. Laslier shows that under a certain small
uncertainty on the recording of votes, this strategy maximizes the odds of improving the
outcome of the election.
Assume that a perfectly accurate poll has been conducted (in particular voters answer
the poll with the ballot they actually intend to cast); given the collection of initial ballot
the voters intend to cast, assuming that after the poll is made public each voter applies
the LR to adjust her ballot, we get a new set of intended ballots to be cast. This creates
a dynamical system which we call the successive polling dynamics (SPD). An equilibrium
(or “dynamical equilibrium”, distinct from a Nash equilibrium) is then a fixed point of
this dynamics, i.e. a state where if all voters would adjust their ballots according the
announced results, the adjusted ballots would produce the same result). Laslier second
important result can be phrased as follows: whenever there is a Condorcet winner, under
SPD there exist at least one dynamical equilibrium and any dynamical equilibrium elects
the Condorcet winner. Again, the question of the “attractivity” of the equilibrium is
not addressed.
1.3 Description of the main results
The goal of this note is to construct examples showing that in Approval Voting, the
SPD can exhibit a problematic cycle even in the presence of a Condorcet winner (the
main point shall not be the mere existence of cycles, a rather unsurprizing phenomenon,
but rather that such cycles can result in the election of a suboptimal candidate). As
noted by Laslier, previous examples of cycles (notably in [BF07]) needed some voters
to change their strategy at some iteration of the process; in our example the assumed
strategic behaviors is consistent, i.e. constant in time; they are also sincere, and simple.
In one example (Section 3), we assume all voters apply the Leader Rule, thus addi-
tionally implying a rather strong form of rationality under Laslier’s uncertainty model,
and we show that SPD exhibits a cycle where the Condorcet winner cannot be elected.
Moreover the basin of attraction of the cycle, i.e. the set of initial state leading to the
cycle under SPD, is quite larger than the basin of attraction of the Condorcet-winner-
electing equilibrium: in practice, it seems quite likely to get caught in a such cycle
instead of converging to the stable equilibrium.
In a second example (Section 4), we assume a slight modification of the Leader Rule:
some voters have several candidates they decide never to approve; the strategy is thus
kept simple, sincere, and consistent. In this example, there is a Condorcet winner and
a worst candidate, which not only is a Condorcet loser, but in fact has almost two-third
of the electorate that would never approve of her. We get two equilibriums, one electing
the Condorcet winner the other electing another candidate, and a cycle of order 2 which
attracts two-third of the possible states in the SPD and where one of the state elects
the worst candidate.
These examples, while specific, are quite stable: the polls creating transition from one
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expected order of candidates to another are not too close calls, so that their parameters
can easily be changed in a range without changing the SPD. In addition, they are stable
under perturbation of the model itself: in Section 5 we show the persistence of our
examples in a continuous-space model where:
∙ at each iteration only a given fraction of voters adjust their ballots strategically
(e.g. the other not being aware of the poll, or being reluctant to change their
minds),
∙ a fixed strategy is assumed for each voter type only when the candidates scores
are sufficiently far apart, without making any assumption on the voters behavior
in case of almost equality between any two candidates.
These examples show that Approval Voting exhibits strong issues with respect to
polling effects on election outcome (but we do not claim that this flaw does not appear
in many other voting systems), in particular mitigating the Condorcet-in-practice stance
that could be assumed in view of previous works:
∙ a slight modification of the Leader Rule can create equilibriums not electing a
Condorcet winner, even when one exists,
∙ Condorcet-electing equilibriums can fail to attract most possible states, i.e. most
initial expections on the outcome of the election could lead to cycle not ensuring
the election of the Condorcet winner, even when applying the Leader Rule,
∙ polling can have an extreme impact on the election outcome: rigging any one poll
can prevent the election of the Condorcet winner even if all subsequent polls are
perfectly conducted and reported; and in fact, even if all polls are perfect but
in the first one voters respond according to a pre-established expectation of the
outcome of the election, this expectation can determine the outcome of the election
even after arbitrary many polls: polling induces neither synchronization nor loss
of memory,
∙ even with perfect unrigged polls, the sheer number of polls (e.g. its parity) can
decide the outcome of the election,
∙ the SPD can get a majority of first poll results to lead after iteration to a cycle,
some states of which elect a candidate fully disapproved by a large majority of
voters,
∙ combining the last two items, the parity of the number of polls conducted can lead
to elect a candidate fully disapproved by a large majority of voters.
Acknowledgments. I am indebted to Adrien Fauré @AdrienGazouille for a long de-
bate on twitter (in French) that lead me to seek and design the examples presented
here, and to François Durand for introducing me to the Social choice theory and for
many discussions on the Voting Systems. This article benefited from relevant comments
provided by Adrien Fauré, Jean-François Laslier and Reshef Meir who I warmly thank.
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2 Formalism and notations
Let us set up some notations and formalize the SPD.
2.1 Candidates, electorate, preferences and strategies.
We consider a finite set of candidates, named by lower-case letter from the beginning of
the alphabet, C = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, . . . }. An outcome is a total order on the set of candidates,
written as a word in the candidates names (so that for three candidates, the possible
outcomes are 𝑎𝑏𝑐, 𝑎𝑐𝑏, 𝑏𝑎𝑐, 𝑏𝑐𝑎, 𝑐𝑎𝑏, 𝑐𝑏𝑎) and represent the order in which the candidate
are ranked by an election (or poll); we thus assume there is some tie-breaking rule (e.g.
alphabetic order). The set of outcomes is denoted by O. Given an outcome 𝑜, the
first-ranked candidate is called the elected candidate or the winner (“expected winner”
in the case of a poll) and is denoted by 𝑤(𝑜); the second-ranked candidate is called the
runner-up (expected runner-up) and is denoted by 𝑟(𝑜). We denote 𝛼 ≻𝑜 𝛽 to say that
𝛼 is ranked before 𝛽 in 𝑜 (so that for example 𝑤(𝑜) ≻𝑜 𝑟(𝑜)).
The preferences of a voter is an order on C , possibly with ties (this will play a role
in our second example); we denote 𝛼 >𝜋 𝛽 to say that 𝛼 is strictly preferred to 𝛽 in
the preferences 𝜋, and 𝛼 ≥𝜋 𝛽 to say that 𝛼 is preferred to 𝛽 or tied with her. A set of
preferences can be denoted in the same way than an outcome, with parentheses to group
the tied candidates, e.g. 𝑎(𝑏𝑐)𝑑 means 𝑎 is the favorite candidate, 𝑑 is the least preferred,
and 𝑏 and 𝑐 are tied, both ranked between 𝑎 and 𝑑. The set of possible preferences is
denoted by P.
Assuming Approval Voting is used, a ballot is an arbitrary subset of C ; the set of
ballots is denoted byB. A strategy is a mapping 𝑓 : O → B; we say that a voter applies
strategy 𝑓 if whenever she expects the outcome 𝑜 ∈ O, she casts the ballot 𝑓(𝑜) (in either
an election or in a poll). For a voter with preferences 𝜋 ∈P, a strategy 𝑓 is said to be
sincere whenever for all 𝛼, 𝛽 with 𝛼 ≥𝜋 𝛽 and for all 𝑜 ∈ O, 𝛽 ∈ 𝑓(𝑜) =⇒ 𝛼 ∈ 𝑓(𝑜).
We could have asked instead 𝛼 >𝜋 𝛽 in this definition, but the above choice makes the
sincerity a stronger condition, and thus our results are made stronger.
A particular example of sincere strategy associated with preferences 𝜋 without ties is
the Leader Rule 𝑓LR𝜋 introduced by Laslier [Las09], defined as follows: for all 𝑜 ∈ O and
all 𝛼 ∈ C , 𝛼 ∈ 𝑓LR𝜋 (𝑜) if and only if either 𝛼 >𝜋 𝑤(𝑜) or 𝛼 = 𝑤(𝑜) >𝜋 𝑟(𝑜).
We assume a finite set of voter types, named by upper-case letters from the end of
the alphabet T = {𝑍, 𝑌,𝑋, . . . }. The electorate is the data for each voter type Ω of
preferences 𝜋Ω, a strategy 𝑓Ω and a number of voters 𝑛Ω.
2.2 Elections and Successive Polling Dynamics.
An election (also modelling polls) is a tuple of non-negative integers (𝑛𝛽)𝛽∈B giving the
number of each possible ballot cast. The set of all possible elections is denoted by E .
The assumption of Approval Voting yields a fixed mapping AV : E → O, which ranks
the candidate in decreasing order of the number of ballots their name appear of (ties
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broken by alphabetic order). The winner of an election 𝐸 is the first ranked in AV(𝐸),
while the runner-off is the second ranked.
These data together determine the Successive Polling dynamics (SPD), which is the
mapping taking an argument an outcome assumed by all voters, and returning the
outcome from Approval Voting when each voters casts a ballot following her strategy:
SPD : O → O
𝑜 ↦→ AV
(︂ ∑︁
Ω∈T
𝑛Ω ·
(︁
1(𝛼 ∈ 𝑓Ω(𝑜))
)︁
𝛼∈C
)︂
.
where 1(𝐴) is 1 whenever the assertion 𝐴 is true, and 0 whenever it is false.
This model in particular assumes consistent strategies (strategies do not vary in time),
and moreover that strategies only depend on the expected outcome of the election;
outcomes will therefore also be called states. In a generalized framework, states would
be the possible arguments of the mapping determining a strategy. SPD models the
situation where before the election a certain number 𝑘 of perfect polls are conducted
before the election (perfect meaning that they are answered sincerely, i.e. each voter
tells the ballot he or she would cast given the current expected outcome, they are made
publicly available, and all voters are polled). Then, if we assume initial intended ballots
𝑏0(Ω) for each voter type Ω, the first poll result is
𝑜0 = AV
(︂ ∑︁
Ω∈T
𝑛Ω ·
(︁
1(𝛼 ∈ 𝑏0(Ω)
)︁
𝛼∈C
)︂
and the final outcome of the election is SPD𝑘(𝑜0).
We are thus interested in the dynamical properties of SPD, i.e. of the behavior of its
iterates SPD𝑘 and especially in its orbits (i.e. the families (SPD𝑘(𝑜))𝑘∈Z+ where 𝑜 ∈ O).
A periodic orbit (also named cycle) is a family of distinct states 𝑜1, . . . , 𝑜𝑝 such that
SPD(𝑜𝑖) = 𝑜𝑖+1 for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑝 − 1} and SPD(𝑜𝑝) = 𝑜1, i.e. it. The number 𝑝 is
called the period of the periodic orbit, which is also called a cycle, or 𝑝-cycle to precise
the period. A fixed point (also named dynamical equilibirum) is a 1-cycle, i.e. a state 𝑜
such that SPD(𝑜) = 𝑜. A cycle is said to be trivial if all its states have the same winner;
otherwise it said to be non-trivial (non-triviality implies that the cycle has period at
least 2). Given a cycle 𝑜1, . . . , 𝑜𝑝, its basin of attraction is the set of all states 𝑜′ such
that there exist 𝑘 ∈ Z+ and 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑝} such that SPD𝑘(𝑜′) = 𝑜𝑖. We can represent
SPD by the oriented graph with O as set of vertices, and with exactly one outgoing edge
for each 𝑜 ∈ O, with endpoint SPD(𝑜). Cycles are then cycle of the oriented graph, and
fixed point are states with a loop.
Remark 2.1. This model is restrictive as it assumes all voters adjust their ballots
simultaneously (but see Section 5 that broadens its relevance). If one considers instead
arbitrary groups of voters adjusting their ballots in some way (beneficial to them given
the current state of affairs, i.e. better-replies), then several definition of acyclicity have
been defined (see e.g. [MPRJ17]); in particular strong acyclicity means that whatever
the order of adjustments is and whatever better-replies are chosen by the voters, the
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system converges to an equilibrium while weak acyclicity means that there exist an
order and better-replies leading to an equilibrium. With this synchronized setting, our
examples will exclude strong acyclicity but not weak acyclicity.
2.3 Remarkable Candidates and the SPD.
Note that the preferences play no role in SPD; their importance is that they enable to
define a sincere strategy (and not all strategies have a preferences 𝜋 for which they are
sincere, so the assumption is a restriction even if the preferences are unrestricted), and
they enable to define particular candidates with particular significance with respect to
a given electorate.
When a cycle occurs, an important point is whether the elected candidates in the
various states of the cycle are the same, and whether they have a particular quality.
Given an electorate, a candidate 𝛼 is said to dominate a candidate 𝛽 (sometimes written
𝛼 > 𝛽, but beware that this is not a transitive relation) whenever there are more voters
that strictly prefer 𝛼 to 𝛽 than voters that prefer 𝛽 to 𝛼 or are indifferent between
the two. Given we allowed for ties in preferences, there are several possible definitions
and we choose the stronger one; in particular, it cannot happen that at same time 𝛼
dominates 𝛽 and 𝛽 dominates 𝛼.
A candidate 𝛼 is then said to be a Condorcet winner whenever she dominates every
other candidate; a Condorcet winner may or may not exist, but if it exist it is unique.
A candidate 𝛽 is said to be a Condorcet loser whenever she is dominated by every
other candidate; again, a Condorcet loser may or may not exist and is unique if she
exist. Similarly, one says that a total order 𝑜 ∈ O is a Condorcet order whenever each
candidate dominates all candidates ranked below them in 𝑜. Last, we will use a stronger
notion than Condorcet loser: a candidate is said to be a worst candidate whenever there
is a strict majority of the electorate that ranks her last (possibly tied with others) in
their preferences.
Given a set of candidates and an electorate, there are many questions of interest:
are there equilibrium or trivial cycles, and which candidate do they elect? are there
non-trivial cycles, and which candidates are elected in the various states of the cycles?
when there are several cycles, how big are their respective basin of attraction? which
cycle has a particular state, e.g. the state where each voter votes only for her favorite
candidate, in its basin of attraction, and which candidates can be elected in this cycle?
how do the answers to all these questions depend on the electorate?
3 First example
In this Section, we prove the following.
Theorem A. Using Approval Voting, there exist an electorate on a set of 4 candidates
such that:
∙ there is a Condorcet winner,
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∙ each voter has preferences without ties and follows as strategy the Leader Rule,
∙ SPD has a cycle, whose basin of attraction contains a majority (actually two-third)
of the states, and none of whose states elects the Condorcet winner.
Proof. We set C = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑} and consider an electorate with 7 types of voters, with
the following preferences and numbers (strategies are given by the Leader Rule):
𝑇 : 𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑 100 𝑈 : 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑑 1000 𝑋 : 𝑏𝑐𝑎𝑑 1004
𝑉 : 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑏 1001 𝑌 : 𝑐𝑑𝑎𝑏 1008
𝑊 : 𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑐 1002 𝑍 : 𝑑𝑏𝑎𝑐 1016
The voters in classes 𝑈, 𝑉,𝑊 like 𝑎 but each prefers one of 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 better, while the voters
in classes 𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍 do not like 𝑎 too much but distaste one of 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 even more, creating
a cycle of collective preferences 𝑏 > 𝑐 > 𝑑 > 𝑏 (with 𝑎 close to tie with each of 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑).
Meanwhile, voters in 𝑇 prefers 𝑎 to any other player, and their moderate number suffice
to make 𝑎 a Condorcet winner, while maintaining the cyclic preference between 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑.
The precise numbers of classes 𝑈 to 𝑍 are chosen to exclude any perfect tie (different
sums of distinct powers of 2 never agree); this is only for the sake of fanciness, to avoid
needing tiebreakers.
Consider the outcome 𝑜1 = 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑑. Under the Leader Rule, it leads to the following
ballots and results:
𝑇 : {𝑎} 𝑈 : {𝑏} 𝑋 : {𝑏} 𝑎 : 3111 𝑏 : 3020
𝑉 : {𝑐, 𝑎, 𝑑} 𝑌 : {𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑎} 𝑐 : 2009
𝑊 : {𝑑, 𝑎} 𝑍 : {𝑑, 𝑏} 𝑑 : 4027
so that 𝑜2 := SPD(𝑜1) = 𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑐 – i.e. 𝑎 stays second, while the seemingly unthreatening
𝑑 gets first position in a cyclic rotation of 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑. By symmetry, we can already tell that
a cycle will occur, but for the sake of completeness here are the computations. The
strategic adjustments triggered by 𝑜2 are as follows:
𝑇 : {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} 𝑈 : {𝑏, 𝑎, 𝑐} 𝑋 : {𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑎} 𝑎 : 3105 𝑏 : 2104
𝑉 : {𝑐, 𝑎} 𝑌 : {𝑐, 𝑑} 𝑐 : 4113
𝑊 : {𝑑} 𝑍 : {𝑑} 𝑑 : 3026
so that 𝑜3 := SPD(𝑜2) = 𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑏. The corresponding strategic adjustments are then:
𝑇 : {𝑎𝑏} 𝑈 : {𝑏, 𝑎} 𝑋 : {𝑏, 𝑐} 𝑎 : 3118 𝑏 : 4122
𝑉 : {𝑐} 𝑌 : {𝑐} 𝑐 : 3013
𝑊 : {𝑑, 𝑎, 𝑏} 𝑍 : {𝑑, 𝑏, 𝑎} 𝑑 : 2018
so that SPD(𝑜3) = 𝑜1.
Similar computations gives the graph of SPD, represented in Figure 1.
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a b c d
a b d  c
a c b d
a c d b
b c a d
b c d a
b d a c
b d c a
c d a b
c d b a
d a b c
d a c b
b a c d
b a d c
c a b d
c a d b
c b a d
c b d a
d b a c
d b c a
d c a b
d c b a
a d c b
a d b c
Figure 1: The SPD of the first example. When two states agree on the winner and
runner-up, they must have the same image state and are thus represented
together. States that can be observed after arbitrary long iterations of the
map are represented in gray (one fixed point and a 3-cycle).
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Remark 3.1. In the cases of 𝑛 > 4 candidates, we can take the above example and
add 𝑛− 4 dummy candidates that appear at the end of all voters preferences. The only
property that may not be preserved in this operation is the size of the basin of attraction
of the 3-cycle: for example the states starting with one of the dummy variables will all
be sent by SPD to a state starting with 𝑎, since voters would vote for all of 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑.
However this is easily fixed by adding a voter type, for example in the case of a fifth
candidate 𝑒 one could take 𝑆 : 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑑𝑎, 50. Indeed, this voters will break the tie between
𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 whenever 𝑒 is the expected winner, in favor of 𝑏, thus leading to the basin of
attraction of the 3-cycle.
We do not know whether Theorem A holds for 3 candidates; a tedious case by case
analysis shows that 3 candidates and 3 voters type cannot lead to both a cycle and a
Condorcet winner.
4 Second example
This second example, at the small cost of considering a slightly broader set of strategies,
improves on the previous one on two accounts: it necessitates only 3 candidate, and it
exhibits a cycle where a worst candidate could get elected.
Theorem B. Using Approval Voting, there exist an electorate on 3 candidates such that:
∙ there are a Condorcet winner and a worst candidate,
∙ each voter follows a consistent, sincere strategy,
∙ SPD has a 2-cycle, whose basin of attraction contains a majority (actually two-
third) of the states, and one of whose state elects the worst candidate,
∙ there is an equilibrium not electing the Condorcet winner.
Proof. We consider the following type of voters:
𝑍 : 𝑎𝑏𝑐 101 𝑌 : 𝑎(𝑏𝑐) 2 𝑋 : 𝑏𝑎𝑐 100 𝑊 : 𝑐(𝑎𝑏) 104
with as strategy the Leader Rule as it was introduced above (for all 𝛼 ∈ C , 𝛼 ∈ 𝑓LR𝜋 (𝑜) if
and only if 𝛼 >𝜋 𝑤(𝑜) or 𝛼 = 𝑤(𝑜) >𝜋 𝑟(𝑜)); note that with the ties some new situations
appear: voters of type𝑊 will not choose between 𝑎 and 𝑏, thus always casting the ballot
{𝑐}, no matter which outcome is expected. Similarly, voters of type 𝑌 always cast the
ballot 𝑎 (this last type is only introduced here for tie-breaking).
Note that 𝑎 is a Condorcet winner, beating 𝑏 with a score of 103 to 100 (voters of
type 𝐶 abstaining) and 𝑐 with a score of 203 to 104. Moreover 𝑐 is a Condorcet looser,
loosing to 𝑏 by another landslide 104 to 201: about two-third of the electorate would
never vote for 𝑐, making a worst candidate (by quite a margin).
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Assume as starting expected outcome the result obtained if each voters votes for every
candidates she does not rank last:
𝑍 : {𝑎, 𝑏} 𝑌 : {𝑎} 𝑋 : {𝑏, 𝑎} 𝑊 : {𝑐}
𝑎 : 203 𝑏 : 201 𝑐 : 104
leading to 𝑎 being expected winner and 𝑏 expected runner-up (corresponding to the
Condorcet order). This leads voters of type 𝑍 and 𝑋 to adjust their votes: their favorite
candidate is either threatened by their second-favorite (for 𝑍) or have a shot at winning
the election from a current runner-up position (for 𝑋). Consistently with their strategies
they choose to vote only for their favorite candidate:
𝑍 : 𝑎 𝑌 : 𝑎 𝑋 : 𝑏 𝑊 : 𝑐
𝑎 : 103 𝑏 : 100 𝑐 : 104.
The second poll thus results in a close-call win of 𝑐 with 𝑎 as runner-up. This result
induces voters of type 𝑍 and 𝑋 to resume approving both 𝑎 and 𝑏, in order not to let
𝑐 be elected (again, this is a consistent application of the modified Leader Rule). This
results in the the same ballots being cast as in the first poll, so we get a 2-cycle, one of
the states electing the worse candidate.
Drawing the full graph of SPD in this case (Figure 2), we see that of 6 states, 4
lead to the cycle that can elect either the Condorcet winner 𝑎 or the worst candidate
𝑐 depending on whether the number of polls conducted before the election is odd or
even, while the other 2 are stable, one electing the Condorcet winner 𝑎 the other the
Condorcet runner-up 𝑏.
b a c
a b c
c b ac a b
a c b
b c a
Figure 2: The SPD map of the second example. States that can be observed after arbi-
trary long iterations of the map are represented in gray (two fixed point and
a 2-cycle).
Remark 4.1. We could avoid ties and preserve the features of the examples by splitting
𝑊 into two types of voters of equal size, with respective preferences 𝑐𝑎𝑏 and 𝑐𝑏𝑎 and
strategy to always vote {𝑐} (with the interpretation that these voters prefer 𝑐 to the
other two by far, but still have a slight preference between 𝑎 and 𝑏).
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Remark 4.2. It could be argued that in a real-life situation, some of the electors would
fail to adjust their votes and the close-call situation where 𝑐 receive 104 votes and 𝑎 only
103 might not happen. However, we made these choice of number to make 𝑐 the worst
possible candidate we could; we can preserve the essence of the example by taking |𝑊 |
anywhere between 103 and 200, trading stability of the 2-cycle against unpopularity of
𝑐.
Remark 4.3. Another argument that could be raised against this example is that it
needs that a large proportion of voters having 𝑐 as favorite candidate would never vote
for any other candidate. While this is indeed a crucial feature of the voters preferences
in this example, there are two counter-arguments. First, this situation seems not all that
unlikely: far-right candidates with a strong anti-establishment discourse can have many
supporters who would consider all other candidates (or at least those with a chance of
being elected) as part of the very same “establishment” and thus would only approve 𝑐.
Second, this can be a textbook case of manipulation by a coalition: if the minority of
all voters who prefer 𝑐 (with preferences 𝑐𝑏 or 𝑐𝑎 say) gather in a coalition and decide to
vote only for 𝑐, they get a good chance to have 𝑐 elected against the will of a two-third
majority! Actually, these counter-arguments feed on each other: an anti-establishment
discourse can serve the purpose of forming a coalition-in-practice of voters who will not
express their preferences between 𝑎 and 𝑏 in order to favor 𝑐.
5 Stability of cycles in a continuous model
The above discrete-time, discrete space model is quite crude and thus can fail to convince
that cycle could appear in practice. Discreteness of time is relevant, since polls occur
at precise times, triggering some ballot adjustments. Discreteness of space is more of a
weakness of the model; more precisely, the assumptions that all voters of a given type
adjust their ballots at each poll, and that the strategies depend only on the expected
outcome without taking into account almost ties are unrealistic. In this section, we
propose a discrete-time, continuous-space setting and show that the cycles in the above
examples are stable: they persist even when we assume only a (large enough) fraction
of voters to adjust their ballot at each poll, and in the continuous model they are
attractive: all states near enough to the cycle are attracted to it. Attractiveness is
obviously preserved if we perturb the dynamics far from the cycle, so that the cycles
persist even if we only assume the strategies above to be applied away from almost ties.
5.1 A continuous-state setting
We expand the setting of Section 2 in the following way. To each voter type Ω is
associated a set BΩ ⊂ B of admissible ballots, representing the ballots that could be
cast by voters of this type. It could be the set of sincere ballots according to their
preferences 𝜋Ω, thus assuming mere sincerity; or if we are embedding a discrete example
as we will, it could be the image set 𝑓Ω(O) of the strategy 𝑓Ω of this type.
12
Given a finite set X , we consider the simplex of vertex set X :
Δ(X ) :=
{︁
(𝑝𝑥)𝑥∈X ∈ [0, 1]X
⃒⃒⃒ ∑︁
𝑥∈X
𝑝𝑥 = 1
}︁
.
An element of of Δ(X ) can be interpreted as a probability vector on X or simply as
a the proportions of a distribution of some quantity over the elements of X . A state is
said to be extreme when for each Ω, exactly one of the proportion is 1 and the others
are 0; the set of extreme states is finite and can be identified with ∏︀Ω∈T BΩ.
A state is now an element of
S :=
∏︁
Ω∈T
Δ(BΩ)
i.e. a state 𝑠 ∈ S gives for each voter type and each admissible ballot the proportion
of the voters of that type planing to cast this ballot. The use of a continuous model
assumes voters are sufficiently numerous that we can consider each type arbitrarily
finely divisible; the voters’ counts 𝑛Ω now only represent their respective proportion of
all voters, rather than absolute numbers. There is a natural mapping which associates
to each state the election that would result from the casting of the planned ballots:
𝑣 : S → E
𝑠 =
(︁
(𝑝Ω𝑏 )𝛽∈BΩ
)︁
Ω∈T ↦→
(︁∑︁
Ω
𝑛Ω · 𝑝Ω𝛽
)︁
𝛽∈B
where 𝑝Ω𝛽 is considered zero whenever 𝛽 /∈ BΩ. The mapping AV∘𝑣 : S → O thus sends
a state to the outcome that would result from it (recall that we assumed a tie-breaking
rule, e.g. by alphabetical order).
A general poll dynamics (GPD) is a map Φ : S → S ; such a generality is meant to
allow more modeling possibilities, but the interesting GPDs are those that are grounded
in a natural way in the other elements of the model.
Given an electorate, we choose as suggested above BΩ = 𝑓Ω(O) and consider the
particular GPD which corresponds to all voters to apply the strategy of her type given
the expected outcome, i.e.
Φ0(𝑠) =
(︁
1(𝑓Ω ∘ AV ∘ 𝑣(𝑠) = 𝛽)𝛽∈BΩ
)︁
Ω∈T .
The mapping Φ0 takes its values in the set of extreme states, and after the first iteration
does not convey any more information than the mapping SPD given by the electorate.
We consider the supremum norm |·| on S , i.e. given two states 𝑠 = (𝑝Ω𝛽 ) and 𝑠 = (𝑝Ω𝛽 )
we set
|𝑠− 𝑠| = sup
Ω∈T ,𝛽∈BΩ
⃒⃒⃒
𝑝Ω𝛽 − 𝑝Ω𝛽
⃒⃒⃒
Given two GPDs Φ,Ψ and a set of states 𝐴 ∈ S , we consider
𝐷𝐴(Φ,Ψ) := sup
𝑠∈𝐴
⃒⃒⃒
Φ(𝑠)−Ψ(𝑠)
⃒⃒⃒
and use 𝐷 as a shortcut for 𝐷S , which is a metric on the set of all GPDs. More generally,
𝐷𝐴(Φ,Ψ) quantifies how close Φ and Ψ are on 𝐴; a smaller 𝐴 makes upper bounds on
𝐷𝐴 more lenient.
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5.2 A continuous-state example with a cycle
Using a slight modification of our second example above, we get the following result
where choices have been made to make all constants explicit (but they are not optimal).
Theorem C. There exist an electorate on three candidates such that:
∙ there are a Condorcet winner and a worst candidate,
∙ each voter type is assigned a consistent, sincere strategy,
∙ for any GPD Φ where 85% of the voters of each type adjust their ballot according
to their type’s strategy whenever the expected election gives an outcome with at
least 4 percentage points of margin between candidates (the reminding 15% keep
their previous ballot and the GPD is arbitrary when margins are lower than 4%),
Φ has an attractive 2-cycle one of whose states elects the worst candidate.
Proof. We consider the following four-types electorate
𝑍 : 𝑎𝑏𝑐 3 𝑌 : 𝑎(𝑏𝑐) 1 𝑋 : 𝑏𝑎𝑐 3 𝑊 : 𝑐(𝑎𝑏) 5
with the modified Leader Rule as in Section 4 and the corresponding sets of admissible
ballots. Again, 𝑎 is a Condorcet winner and 𝑐 a worst candidate (now refused by 7/12th
of the electorate: we traded some badness of 𝑐 for more stability). Observe that
∙ Δ(B𝑌 ) = Δ(
{︁
{𝑎}
}︁
) and Δ(B𝑊 ) are both singletons and can be ignored in the
product,
∙ Δ(B𝑋) = Δ(
{︁
{𝑏}, {𝑎, 𝑏}
}︁
) can be identified with [0, 1], denoting by 𝑥 the propor-
tion of voters of type 𝑋 that cast the ballot {𝑎, 𝑏},
∙ Δ(B𝑍) = Δ(
{︁
{𝑎}, {𝑎, 𝑏}
}︁
) can be identified with [0, 1] by representing a probabil-
ity vector by the proportion 𝑧 of voters of type 𝑍 that cast the ballot {𝑎, 𝑏}.
In this way, we can identify S and [0, 1]2 with coordinates (𝑥, 𝑧).
The three lines corresponding to ties (of equation (𝑧 = 𝑥 + 13) for 𝑎 and 𝑏; (𝑥 =
1
3)
for 𝑎 and 𝑐; (𝑧 = 23) for 𝑏 and 𝑐) are concurrent at the point where all three candidates
are tied, and define six regions in S corresponding to the six possible outcomes (the
lines themselves are attributed to one outcome according to the tie-breaking rule), as
show in Figure 3. The region 𝐴1 delimited by the lines of equations (𝑧 < 𝑥 + 16) and
(𝑧 > 56) results in the outcome 𝑎𝑏𝑐 with margins of
1
24th of the electorate, i.e. slightly
over 4%. Similarly, the region 𝐴2 delimited by the lines of equations (𝑧 < 𝑥 + 16) and
(𝑥 < 16) result in the outcome 𝑐𝑎𝑏 with the same margins. Assuming Φ is a GPD
with the property assumed in the third item, we have Φ(𝑥, 𝑧) = (0.15𝑥, 0.15𝑧) whenever
(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑅1 and Φ(𝑥, 𝑧) = (0.85+0.15𝑥, 0.85+0.15𝑧) whenever (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑅2. In particular,
Φ(𝑅1) ⊂ 𝑅2 and Φ(𝑅2) ⊂ 𝑅1. It follows that Φ2(𝑅1) ⊂ 𝑅1, and since Φ2 is a contraction
on 𝑅1 (of ratio 0.152) it must have a fixed point (𝑥1, 𝑧1) ∈ 𝑅1. Then the orbit of
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Figure 3: Left – a continuous-space example: the corners are the extreme states, corre-
sponding to the four outcomes that are possible given the assigned strategies;
if all voters adjust their ballot after a poll (GPD Φ0), the whole 𝑎𝑏𝑐 and 𝑏𝑎𝑐
regions are sent to the bottom-left corner, the 𝑐𝑎𝑏 and 𝑐𝑏𝑎 regions to the upper-
right corner, the 𝑏𝑐𝑎 region to the upper-right corner and the 𝑎𝑐𝑏 region to the
lower-right corner. Right – a GPD where 85% of voters adjust their ballot
when candidates are separated by 4% margins will send the light-grey regions
into each other, thus ensuring a 2-cycle with one state near the upper-rigth
corner, one near the lower-left corner.
(𝑥1, 𝑧1) is a 2-cycle with one state inducing the outcome 𝑎𝑏𝑐 and the other inducing 𝑐𝑎𝑏.
Moreover any element of 𝑅1 ∪ 𝑅2 is attracted to this cycle exponentially fast: e.g. if
(𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑅1, for all 𝑛 ∈ N we have |Φ2𝑛(𝑥, 𝑧) − (𝑥1, 𝑧1)| ≤ 0.152𝑛|(𝑥, 𝑧) − (𝑥1, 𝑧1)| and
|Φ2𝑛+1(𝑥, 𝑧)− Φ(𝑥1, 𝑧1)| ≤ 0.152𝑛+1|(𝑥, 𝑧)− (𝑥1, 𝑧1)| .
5.3 A general stability result
The above example was meant to be tangible and explicit, but the underlying phe-
nomenon is quite general. The following result is easily proven with the same ideas.
Theorem D. Consider an electorate on a given set C of candidates, such that the SPD
has a cycle 𝑜1, . . . , 𝑜𝑘. We denote by 𝐵𝑖 = (𝑓Ω(𝑜𝑖−1))Ω∈T the vector of the ballots cast by
the different types along this cycle.
Consider first the GPD Φ0, i.e. assume temporarily that all voters apply their type’s
strategy at each poll, and let 𝜀0 be the largest number such that in every election following
from any 𝐵𝑖, the scores of candidates are separated by at least a fraction 𝜀0 of the
electorate.
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We assume 𝜀0 > 0 (i.e. the tie-breaking rule is not needed in the considered cycle),
and for all 𝜀 ∈ (0, 𝜀0) we denote by 𝐴𝜀𝑖 the largest region of S corresponding to 𝐵𝑖 where
all candidates are separated by at least a fraction 𝜀 of the electorate.
Then for all 𝜀 ∈ (0, 𝜀0) there is a 𝛿 > 0 with the following property: every GPD Φ that
are continuous on each 𝐴𝜀𝑖 and such that 𝐷𝐴𝜀𝑖 (Φ,Φ0) < 𝛿 has a 𝑘-cycle whose elements
are in the 𝐴𝜀𝑖 , in particular with corresponding outcomes 𝑜1, . . . , 𝑜𝑘.
This result means that any cycle of the discrete-space model that does not rely on the
tie-breaking rule is stable: any GPD that is close enough to Φ0 near the cycle exhibit a
similar cycle. In particular, if we only assume at least a given fraction of each voter’s
type adjust their ballot at each polls, and if we only assume the prescribe strategies far
away from ties, we still have a cycle.
Proof. By definition of 𝜀0, each 𝐴𝜀𝑖 is the intersection of [0, 1]T with a polyhedron con-
taining in its interior the extreme point corresponding to 𝐵𝑖, and Φ0 maps it entirely to
the extreme point 𝐵𝑖+1. In particular, Φ𝑘0 sends the whole of 𝐴𝜀1 to the extreme point
𝐵1. If 𝛿 is small enough and 𝐷𝐴𝜀𝑖 (Φ,Φ0) < 𝛿 for all 𝑖, then Φ
𝑘 is close enough to Φ𝑘0 to
map 𝐴𝜀1 into itself. By assumption, Φ𝑘 is continuous on 𝐴𝜀1 which is homeomorphic to
a closed ball. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, Φ𝑘 has a fixed point in 𝐴𝜀1, leading to
the desired cycle of Φ.
Observe that without the continuity hypothesis, we would still get a cycle of outcomes
𝑜1, . . . , 𝑜𝑘, but possibly not a cycle of states nor of elections. If Φ is contracting on each
𝐴𝜀𝑖 , the cycle of states is attracting.
6 Comparison with Plurality Voting
A reasonable question is to ask whether the flaws unveiled by the above examples are
avoided in other voting systems. Considering Plurality Voting, the situation is compli-
cated by the rigidity of the single-name ballot, which forces voters to choose a trade-off
between preferences and probability to improve the outcome of the election. The works
[MLR14] and [Mei15] have studied in depth models taking into account the scores of the
candidates and a level of uncertainty to define the possible voters’ strategies. They ob-
tained several results proving under some assumptions convergence to equilibrium (the
result closest to our present setting is Theorem 5 in [Mei15], where at each iteration an
arbitrary subset of voters adjust their votes according to the current poll results, thus
including the case studied here where all voters adjust their votes at each iteration).
Presence of cycles in a SPD is thus not a universal feature (or rather bug) of voting
systems.
Note that if we tried to design a very simple strategical model inspired by Leader Rule
for Plurality voting, we could consider the case when every voter votes for either the
expected winner or the expected runner-up, whoever comes first in her order of preference
(the rationale is that when the electorate is large, a vote to any other candidate is
orders of magnitude less likely to change the outcome of the election). If we assume
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that voteres apply this “Plurality Leader Rule”, then of course the first poll is decisive
in the polling dynamics and the outcome of the election, since the expected winner and
expected runner-up are the only ones staying in competitions. Then there is always
convergence to an equilibrium, and a very fast one at that (the polls are constant after
the second iteration!) However there are very many equilibria: every candidate that is
not a Condorcet looser could be elected, depending on the results of the first poll. In a
sense, this strategy reduces the SPD to a two-rounds voting system where the first two
candidates in the first round make it to the second one, which is decided by majority.1
At least a Condorcet loser (in particular, a worst candidate) cannot be elected, since if
she makes it to the second poll she is defeated in each poll after the first. Note that this
reasoning shows that any system with an ultimate two-candidates round (e.g. IRV) will
avoid electing a candidate ranked last by a majority of voters, including after successive
polling; this is a very weak but positive feature that Approval Voting lacks.
7 Conclusion
We have considered the Successive Polling Dynamics under Approval Voting, assuming
voters apply simple, consistent, sincere strategies. This dynamics can be thought of as
a model of strategic voting, when voters try to anticipate the outcome of the election to
decide their votes, while not being able to form a large-scale coalition.
In this context, we exhibited two examples showing that Approval Voting is far less
of a Condorcet-in-practice voting system than could have been expected; specifically, we
showed that:
i. assuming voters apply Laslier’s Leader Rule, successive polls can lead from a ma-
jority of initial expected outcomes to a cycle failing to elect an existing Condorcet
winner,
ii. letting voters have only slightly more general strategies, successive polls can lead
to the election of a worst candidate.
We proved that these cycles are stable under natural perturbations: even assuming only
a proportion of voters adjust their ballots at each iteration, and assuming different strate-
gies in case of almost ties, similar cycles persist. This shows that under Approval Voting,
not only convergence to equilibrium may not happen, but cycles can turn individually
sound strategies into sub-optimal or even worst possible outcomes.
Last we made a brief comparison with Plurality Voting. Previous works (in particu-
lar [Las09]) showed that Approval Voting has quite better equilibrium properties than
Plurality Voting (e.g. when there is a Condorcet winner, assuming voters apply the
simple and rational Leader Rule, there exist an equilibrium and any equilibrium elects
the Condorcet winner); what we showed is that Approval Voting, in counterpart, lacks
general convergence to equilibrium, making its equilibrium qualities far less relevant in
practice.
1In some sense, multiple-round voting systems could be thought of as a way to counter the reluctance
of some voters to vote strategically.
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